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Introduction
This Strategic Analysis traces the origins and mean-
ing of the hybrid war debate in Russia. While the 
concept of hybrid war remains an under-developed, 
haphazard collection of conspiracy and other pseu-
do-theories, the debate around it illuminates core 
assumptions about external threats towards Rus-
sia.1 The Strategic Analysis argues that the roots  
of the later hybrid war debate lie in the character-
ization of modern warfare as the integrated use 
of military force and non-military activities. The 
interpretation of hybrid war as a tool used against 
Russia also fits within the pre-existing typology 
of threats towards Russia. The latest turn in this 
debate frames hybrid war as a form of strategic 
coercion, underlining the importance attached to 
this concept, notwithstanding its limited analytical 
value. 
Modern warfare in Russia’s Military  
Doctrine: A comparison
Russia’s 2010 Military Doctrine describes mod-
ern warfare as entailing “the integrated utiliza-
tion of military force, and forces and resources 
1 For a more detailed description of this debate, see Katri Pynnöniemi and Minna Jokela, “Perceptions of hybrid war in Russia: Means, targets and  
objectives identified in the Russian debate”, Cambridge Review of International Affairs, Vol 33, Issue 6 (2020): 828-845, DOI: 10.1080/09557571. 
2020.1787949.
2 Cited in Michael Kofman and Matthew Rojansky, “A Closer Look at Russia’s ‘Hybrid War’”, Kennan Cable, No. 7 (April 2015): 2,  
https://www.wilsoncenter.org/publication/kennan-cable-no7-closer-look-russias-hybrid-war. Last accessed 14 May 2021.
3 Russian Military Doctrine, Approved by Russian Federation presidential edict, December 25, 2014, www.scrf.gov.ru/security/military/document129/. 
Last accessed 14 May 2021.
4 Kofman and Rojansky, “A Closer Look at Russia’s ‘Hybrid War’”, 3.
5 Ibid.
of a non-military character”.2 The 2014 edition of 
the Military Doctrine defines in more detail this 
nexus between military and non-military activities. 
Accordingly, modern warfare consists of “a coor-
dinated use of armed forces and political, eco-
nomic, information and other non-military activi-
ties, together with the exploitation of the protest 
potential of the population and the use of special 
forces”. The same paragraph also lists “the use of 
externally funded and run political forces and social 
movements”, and the “use of indirect and asymmet-
ric methods”3 as characteristics of modern warfare. 
Along with these new elements, both editions 
list traditional features of modern warfare (e.g. the 
massive use of military technology, selectivity and 
a high degree of destruction, increasing the speed 
and depth of hostilities). However, it is important to 
bear in mind that neither the 2010 Doctrine nor the 
revised version in 2014 articulate a “coherent or 
preconceived”4 hybrid war doctrine. As suggested by 
Kofman and Rojansky, the elaboration of the char-
acteristics of modern warfare is simply “Russia’s 
attempt to catch up conceptually to the realities of 
modern war with which the United States has been 
grappling for over a decade in Iraq, Afghanistan,  
and elsewhere”.5 
The concept of hybrid war in  
Russia: A national security threat 
and means of strategic coercion
The hybrid war concept offers a general framework for explaining threats to-
wards Russia, and legitimizes Russia’s actions as necessary counter-measures to 
actions taken by the West. According to this perception, Russia is only mitigating 
and preventing conflicts, rather than activating and aggravating them – writes 
assistant professor and holder of the Mannerheim Chair of Russian  
Security Studies Katri Pynnöniemi.
4   
From the viewpoint of subsequent debate on 
‘hybrid war’, the key article in the 2010 Doctrine 
clarifies for what purpose informational and polit-
ical means are used in a conflict. It states that one 
of the characteristics of modern warfare is “early 
implementation of information warfare measures 
to achieve political goals without the use of military 
force, and subsequently, in the interests of form-
ing a favorable reaction of the world community to 
the use of military force”.6 However, this particular 
paragraph is not included in the 2014 version of 
the Doctrine. The idea appeared later in a modified 
form when Russian Chief of General Staff Valery 
Gerasimov described what he called ‘hybrid  
methods’:
“Their content includes the achievement 
of political goals with minimal armed effect 
against the enemy, mainly by undermining 
economic and military potential, by informa-
tional and psychological influence, by active 
support of internal opposition, partisan and 
sabotage methods of conducting an armed 
struggle.”7 
This speech signalled Russia’s official take on hybrid 
war although, as suggested above, the characteri-
zation of modern warfare in the 2010 Military Doc-
trine included similar elements even at that time.
The change that took place in this debate 
in 2014 concerned the nexus of military and 
non-military activities being framed as a hybrid 
war against Russia, rather than an analytical 
problem to be resolved. This shift is particularly 
evident in the expert discussion, where the hybrid 
war concept describes attempts to undermine  
Russia’s sovereignty, civilizational originality and  
 
6 Russian Military Doctrine, Approved by Russian Federation presidential edict, February 5, 2010. Translation published at  
https://carnegieendowment.org/files/2010russia_military_doctrine.pdf. Last accessed 14 May 2021.
7 Valerii Gerasimov, “Организация обороны Российской Федерации в условиях применения противником «традиционных» и «гибридных» , 19-23методов 
ведения войны”, Vestnik Akademii Voennyh Nauk, no. 2 (2016): 20.
8 Pynnöniemi and Jokela, “Perceptions of hybrid war in Russia”, 830-831; see also Gudrun Persson, “Russian thoughts on hybrid war and colour revolu-
tions”, Russian Studies Series (2020), http://www.ndc.nato.int/research/research.php?icode=625. Last accessed 14 May 2021.
9 Aleksandr Bartosh, “цель и механизмы модели управляемого хаоса”, Nezavisimaya Gazeta, September 27, 2013,  
http://nvo.ng.ru/concepts/2013-09-27/6_chaos.html. Last accessed 14 May 2021.
10 Aleksandr Bartosh, ‘Oдкб в прицеле цветных революций,’ Nezavisimaya gazeta, April 11, 2014, http://nvo.ng.ru/wars/2014-04-11/1_odkb.html.  
Last accessed 14 May 2021.
11 Bartosh, “цель и механизмы модели управляемого хаоса”; Bartosh, “Oдкб в прицеле цветных революций”.
12 Alan Dulles was  the director of the CIA, but the ‘Dulles Plan’ originates from the Brezhnev-era film and novel The Eternal Call, which features a 
villain called Alan Dulles. Like similar conspiracy theories, the Dulles Plan is taken as evidence of a plot to destroy the Soviet Union, and later the Russian 
Federation. Eliot Borenstein, Plots against Russia. Conspiracy and Fantasy after Socialism (Cornell University Press, 2019), 88-89; see also Ieva Bērziņa, 
“Weaponization of ‘Colour Revolutions’”, Journal of Political Marketing (2019): 1-14, DOI: 10.1080/15377857.2019.1678905.
13 Russian National Security Strategy, Approved by Russian Federation presidential edict, December 15, 2015.
status as one of the great powers.8 Hybrid war is 
described as a set of disruptive and constructive 
actions, the ultimate purpose of which is to achieve 
“self-disorganization and self-disorientation of 
the target state”.9 The scale of disruptive actions is 
determined by an “algorithm”10 (a model for action), 
and ranges from long-term operations aimed at 
splintering Russia’s cultural-philosophical tradi-
tions, to the shaping of public perceptions and deci-
sion-making capacity during the crucial phase of the 
conflict. Constructive actions, on the other hand, 
are viewed as defensive measures aimed at enhanc-
ing the integrity of Russia’s society and the consoli-
dation of a positive image of the country.11
Thus, in this context, the concept of hybrid war 
is synonymous with the “controlled chaos” theory, 
the concept of “colour revolutions”, and pseudo-sci-
entific conspiracy narratives (e.g. the Dulles Plan), 
which allegedly explain the US-led political warfare 
against Russia.12 This interpretation is recycled and 
repeated in newspaper articles and in the context 
of Russian academic debate. In official documents, 
the 2015 national security strategy identifies the 
US and the EU as being responsible for “countering 
integration processes and creating seats of tension 
in the Eurasian region”, particularly in Ukraine,13 
whereas the 2014 military doctrine uses more 
ambiguous language in this regard. 
The typology of threats 
As argued above, the integrated use of military and 
non-military activities is seen as both a strategic- 
level threat to Russia, and as a tool that can be used 
in shaping the security environment in accordance 
with Russia’s strategic interests. A cursory exam-
ination of the core assumptions of Russia’s strategic 
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security environment shows that the perception of 
external threats has remained remarkably consis-
tent since the early 2000s.
In an article published in 2003, the late presi-
dent of the Russian Academy of Military Sciences, 
Army General Makhmut Gareev, outlined three 
types of threats towards Russia. 14 The first cat-
egory includes threats that undermine Russia’s 
political independence (sovereignty), and con-
sequently its status as a great power. The sec-
ond group of threats stems from the existence of 
nuclear weapons and their potential use against 
Russia. The third group of threats is multifaceted, 
including the rapid development of the military 
technosphere, and violation of the balance of 
forces near Russia’s borders. The perceived threat 
in both of these cases relates to the fear that Russia 
is lagging behind its main rivals in technology devel-
opment, which undermines its ability to project mil-
itary power globally and in the regional sphere.15 
Interestingly, this typology remains unchanged in 
subsequent articles published between 2003 and 
2019. The most significant change relates to the 
first group of threats. In the 2003 article, this  
group is defined as follows:
“… a long-term policy of certain international 
forces and powers aimed at depriving Russia 
of its independence, interfering in its internal 
affairs and in its economic and other national 
interests.”16 
The 2007 article is dedicated to an elaboration of 
Russia’s new Military Doctrine (published three 
years later in 2010). In this context, Gareev empha-
sized that military and non-military threats should 
be understood as an integrated whole. The article 





14 Makhmut Gareev, “Doklad prezidenta Akademii Veonnyh Nauk, Generala Armii M. A. Gareeva”, Vestnik Akademii Voennyh Nauk, no. 2 (2003): 10.
15 Gareev, “Doklad prezidenta”, 10.
16 Gareev, “Doklad prezidenta”, 10.
17 Makhmut Gareev, “Структура и Основное Содержание Новой Военной Доктрины России”, Voennaia mysl’ no. 3 (2007): 4-5,  
https://dlib.eastview.com/browse/doc/11853158. Last accessed 14 May 2021.
18 Makhmut Gareev, “The character of modern military and non-military threats to the safety of Russia and the organization of the country’s defence”, 
Vestnik Akademii Voennyh Nauk (2013): 4.
19 Gareev, “The character of modern military”, 4. Emphasis added.
20 Makhmut Gareev, “Velikaja pobeda i sobytija na Ukraine”, Vestnik Akademii vojennych nauk, no. 2 (2014): 10. Emphasis added. 
“It is an unfriendly policy and includes efforts 
by certain international forces and states  
to violate the sovereignty of the Russian 
Federation, and discriminate against its eco-
nomic and other interests: various forms of 
political and informational pressure and sub-
versive actions, as was the case in Ukraine, 
Georgia, Kyrgyzstan and other countries; 
territorial claims against the Russian Feder-
ation along almost the entire perimeter of 
its borders […] Hence follows such a defence 
task as the prevention, localization and neu-
tralization of such threats by political, dip-
lomatic, economic, informational and other 
non-military means, relying at the same time 
on military power.” 17
Gareev returned to this theme in 2013, perhaps in 
anticipation of the new Military Doctrine (published 
in December 2014). According to him, a massive 
geopolitical shift had occurred in the world, com-
pletely changing the alignment of forces, as well as 
the nature of threats, and duly requiring new forms 
and methods of counteracting these threats.18 The 
first group of threats, according to Gareev, derives 
from “information and other subversive actions, 
the creation of controlled chaos in order to provoke 
various kinds of unrest in the opposing countries, 
to overthrow undesirable power structures from 
within and disrupt the internal stability of the state, 
as was done in Libya, and recently in Syria”.19 A year 
later in 2014, referring to Russia’s military opera-
tion in Crimea, Gareev argued that Russia should 
be proud of it [the operation], but at the same time, 
should learn the necessary “lessons required to 
improve the alignment of the soft power, politi-
cal, diplomatic and information means, and subse-
quently the efficiency of the entire system of stra-
tegic deterrence”.20 This brings us to the latest phase 
of the debate in the context of which hybrid war is 
interpreted as a means of strategic coercion.
6   
Hybrid war as a means of strategic coercion
In Russian military parlance, strategic deterrence 
(strategicheskoe sderzhivanie) incorporates a set 
of offensive and defensive, nuclear, non-nuclear, 
and non-military tools which, taken together, 
resemble a “combined strategy of containment, 
deterrence, and coercion”.21 It “provides a unify-
ing model for aligning the perceptions of the mili-
tary-political threat environment with the state’s 
instruments of national power, intended to shape 
that environment positively for Russian inter-
ests”. In other words, the term ‘deterrence’ in the 
Russian context refers to a broad set of activi-
ties aimed at war prevention (or ‘containment’ 
in Western parlance) and, in a narrower sense, 
to inducement or intimidation (ustrashenie) in 
respect of a fear of the consequences (e.g. the 
fear of nuclear weapons usage), which denotes 
deterrence through coercion. 
Lastly, the Russian term prinuzhdenie expresses 











21 Kristin Ven Bruusgaard, “Russian strategic deterrence”, Survival, No.4 (2016):7, DOI: 10.1080/00396338.2016.1207945.
22 Michael Kofman, Anya Fink, Jeffrey Edmonds, “Russian strategy for escalation management: evolution of key concepts”, CNA Research Memoran-
dum, (April 2020): 5-6, https://www.cna.org/centers/cna/sppp/rsp/escalation-management. Last accessed 14 May 2021. See also Bruusgaard, “Russian 
strategic deterrence”, 8.
23 Aleksandr Bartosh, “Новый вид сдерживания”, Voenno-Promyshlennyi Kur’er, December 15, 2020, https://www.vpk-news.ru/articles/59962. Last 
accessed 14 May 2021. Aleksandr Bartosh, “Вычисляем будущие конфликты”, Voenno-Promyshlennyi Kur’er, January 19, 2021, https://www.vpk-news.ru/
articles/60450. Last accessed 14 May 2021.
24 A similar argument is presented in Bruusgaard, “Russian strategic deterrence”.
adversary behavior”.22 This last term has recently 
appeared in the context of the hybrid war debate. 
The argument is that “hybrid war” is a form of 
strategic non-military coercion (prinuzhdenie), 
consisting of economic sanctions, cyberattacks, 
information and other operations. These Western 
activities aim to undermine Russia’s political sys-
tem, to provoke conflicts in its neighbourhood, and 
to challenge the country’s status as one of the lead-
ing powers of the multipolar world.23 
The conceptualization of hybrid war as a means 
of strategic coercion underlines what is at stake 
from the Russian perspective. The nexus of mili-
tary and non-military means of coercion is ele-
vated to the level of a strategic threat for Russia. 
At the same time, this habit of assigning new mean-
ings to the concept of hybrid war also reveals that 
the research on non-military means of deterrence 
is relatively underdeveloped.24 Further research is 
required to establish how the perception of threats 
is linked to the conceptualization of modern war-
fare in the Russian context.
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